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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court 
Leslie Mower ("Mower") asked and authorized her husband, Ken Dolezsar 
("Dolezsar"), to assemble and acquire a large amount of property in Hobble Creek 
Canyon on which to build a horse ranch and equestrian center. After Dolezsar's 
death, Mower apparently became unhappy with the way her husband accomplished 
the task. She then filed a Complaint (R. 1-15) against David Simpson · 
("Simpson''), who assisted Dolezsar in finding and acquiring parcels for project, 
(2) two companies that were related to Simpson and that briefly held title to certain 
parcels as they were being assembled, 1 and (3) Kristin Mackey and John Mackey. 
The Simpson Defendants moved for summary judgment. (R. 224-26.) 
Mower opposed the motion (R. 367-83) and submitted the affidavit of Paul Reeb 
(R. 384-87). A week later, Mower submitted a short declaration of her own. (R. 
485-87.) 
1 These two companies are the appellees Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant 
Meadows, LLC. Unless otherwise noted, these two companies-together with 
Simpson-are referred to collectively in this brief as the "Simpson Defendants." 
The districtootirt-held oral argument on the Simpson Defendants' summary 
judgment motion (R. 802-804), and it carefully considered the arg1µ11ents of 
counsel and all of the papers and pleadings on file. The district court ruled that, 
based on the undisputed facts, the Simpson Defendants were entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw. (R. 808-821.) Mower filed a motion to reconsider (R. 827-
933), which the court denied (R. 997-99). Mower then filed this appeal. (R. 1160-
62.) 
Statement of Facts 
T~e district court found that certain facts were undisputed. The court 
specifically noted that 
each and every one of the 19 statements of undisputed facts set forth 
in the Simpson Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment is supported by a combination of: 
1. Very detailed citations to, or quotes from, various 
depositions; 
2. Citations to numerous exhibits attached to the 
memorandum in support; 
3. Citations to the Complaint. 
(R. 815.) The district court also noted that "the Plaintiffs make no citation to any 
deposition, no citation to any affidavit, and no citation to any exhibit." Id. 
Furthermore, the district court found: 
[T]he Plaintiffs do not supportively challenge the interpretation of any 
relied upon testimony from any deposition; they do not claim the 
language was misinterpreted, taken out of context, or that any other 
depositional testimony was contrary in nature or content. They do not 
challenge any of the Simpson Defendants' citations. 
2 
Id. 
For all of these reasons, the district court ruled that the following facts are 
undisputed.2 This following list is a verbatim quotation from the district court's 
ruling (R. 817-19): 
1. In 2005, Mower wanted to purchase enough property in Hobble Creek 
Canyon for a horse ranch and equestrian center. 
2. Mower's since deceased husband, Kenneth Dolezsar ("Dolezsar"), 
worked with David Simpson ("Simpson") to assemble and acquire enough 
property for a horse ranch and equestrian center and instructed that the properties 
be acquired in the name of nominees·. 
3. · Simpson never had any conversations with Mower regarding the 
purchase and acquisition of any of the properties assembled by Simpson and 
Dolezsar for a horse ranch and equestrian center .. 
4. On or about March 3, 2005, Simpson, as the managing member of 
Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee, purchased approximately 268 acres of land in 
Hobble Creek Canyon (the "Crandall Parcel" in connection with assembling 
property for the a horse ranch and equestrian center. 
5. The purchase price of the Crandall Parcel was $2,000,000 and was· 
2 Even now in this appeal Mower does not identify how she specifically challenged 
any of these facts. 
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paid as follows: 
(a) $200,000 to Carolyn Crandall; 
(b) $200,000 to Joan Orton; 
( c) $200,000 to Cathleen C. Lloyd; and 
(d) $1,400,000 to Exchange Pro, Inc. as accommodator for Crandall 
Hobble Creek Ranch, L.L.C., LaMar V. Crandall, operating manager. 
6. On or about February 15, 2006, Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee, 
purchased additional property in Hobble Creek Canyon in connection with 
assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian center (the "Storrs Parcel"). 
7. On or about July 3, 2006, Sirnpson as manager of~heasant Meadows, 
LLC, as nominee, acquired additional property in Hobble Creek Canyon in 
connection with assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian center (the 
"Olsen Parcel"). 
8. On or about March 23, 2006, Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee, 
entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract for additional land in Hobble Creek 
Canyon in connection with assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian 
center (the "Thornhill Parcel"). The owner of the Thornhill Parcel, Hobble Creek 
Investments, agreed to sell the Thornhill Parcel in exchange for the following: 
a. $1,750,000, 
b. approximately 6.5 acres of the Crandall Parcel, and 
9. 
c. approximately 4.5 acres of property owned by Kristin Mackey. 
Previous to and independent of the effort to assemble property for a 
Mower horse ranch and equestrian center, on or about August 4, 2005, Kristin 
Mackey purchased approximately 49 acres of land in Hobble Creek Canyon (the 
"Mac~y Parcel"). Approximately 33 acres were located on the west side of the 
road and approximately 16 acres was located on the east side of the road. 
10. Kristen Mackey agreed to transfer 7.0 acres of her property interest to 
the owners of the Thornhill Parcel in exchange for the Storrs and Olsen Parcels .. 
Mackey agreed to transfer to Mower or her interests 12 to 14 acres of the Mackey 
Parcel that were not necessary for obtaining a building permit for the Mackey 
Parcel from Utah County. 
11. To acquire the Thornhill Parcel required a three way trade involving 
the Crandall Parcel, the Mackey Parcel and the Storrs/Olsen Parcels. The 
Storrs/Olsen Parcels were to be deeded to Mackey; Mackey would then transfer to 
the owners of the Thornhill Parcel an interest in the Mackey Parcel. Also, a 
portion of the Crandall Parcel would be deeded to the owner of the Thornhill 
Parcel. 
12. The three-way trade occurred as follows: 
(a) The Storrs Parcel was transferred to Mackey on August 24, 2006; 
(b) The Olsen Parcel was transferred to Mackey on August 24, 2006; 
5 
(a) .. 
( c) Mackey transferred to the own~r of the Thornhill Parcel a Right of 
Use Easement on August 27, 2006; 
_ (d) The 6.5 acres of the Crandall Parcel was transferred to the owner 
of the Thornhill Parcel on April 27, 2006; 
(e) On August 8, 2006, Simpson, on behalf of Wood Springs, LLC, as 
nominee, and Mackey executed an agreement ( the "Reconveyance Agreement") 
whereby they agreed to transfer to Wood Springs the 12 to 14 acres of the Mackey 
Parcel that would not be necessary for Mackey to obtain a building permit on the 
remaining Mackey Parcel combined with the-Storrs/Olsen Parcel. 
13. The title to the Thornhill Parcel was transferred to Wood Springs, 
LLC, as nominee, on April 27, 2006. 
14. LD, Ranch, LLC constructed an equestrian center on the Thornhill 
Parcel. 
15. LD Ranch, LLC is a limited liability company of which Leslie Dee 
Mower is the sole member. 
16. On or about July 17, 2007, Wood Springs transferred to LD Ranch, 
LLC all of the Thornhill Parcel and all of the Crandall Parcel less 6.5 acres traded 
to acquir"e th_e Thornhill Parcel. 
17. Mower has never accepted the deeds to the 12-14 acres from the 
Mackey Parcel. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is one central, undeniable, and dispositive fact that renders all of 
Mower's arguments and disputes immaterial. The simple fact is that Leslie Mower 
asked and authorized her husband, Dolezsar, to acquire property for a horse ranch 
and equestrian center. Dolezsar was Mower's agent. His actions were her actions. 
His knowledge was her knowledge. 
It does not ·matter that Dolezsar could have acquired different parcels for the 
equestrian center. It does not matter that he might have been able to pay cash for 
properties instead of trading for them. It does not matter that Dolezsar might have 
able to trade a different parcel than the one he actually traded. It do~s not matter 
that he obtained the assistance of David Simpson instead of someone else. It does 
not matter that Dolezsar may not have informed Mower of all of the details of his 
efforts. It does not matter that Mower would have done things differently if she 
had assembled the parcels herself instead of relying on her husban~ and agent. The 
simple fact is that Dolezsar was Mower's agent, and she is bound by his actions. 
This one undisputed fact is fatal to all of Mower's arguments, and the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment. 
In addition, Simpson was not acting as a real estate agent for Mower. There 




As shown below, the district court did not err in finding that the material 
facts in this case were not disputed. Based upon those facts, the district court 
properly ruled that the Simpson Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on each of the causes of action contained in Mower's complaint. 
I. · THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
RULING THAT THE MATERIAL FACTS WERE NOT DISPUTED. 
As Mower admits in her brief to this Court, a trial court "has discretion" to 
"grant summary judgment for noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)(B)." Appellants' 
Opening Brief on Appeal at 24 ( quoting Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding 
Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119,, 24,208 P.3d 1077). Here the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, and-contrary to Mower's suggestion-it did not rely on a 
hyper-technical reading of the rule. Mower offers no explanation as to why she 
could not have complied with the rule. Nevertheless, the district court patiently 
considered her arguments, including giving careful consideration of her motion for 
reconsideration. (R. 997-99. )- The district court even held oral argument on ~he 
motion for reconsideration. (R. 993.) 
In the end, Mower simply did not demonstrate that there was any genuine 
dispute regarding the facts alleged ( and carefully supported) by the Simpson 
Defendants. As one example, the Simpson Defendants cited to specific deposition 
testimony demonstrating that Kristin Mackey had purchased certain property that 
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was eventually acquired for Mower's horse ranch. (R. 231.) Mower disputed 
Simpson's factual statement on the basis that "Mackeys have not proved to the 
satisfaction of Plaintiffs that they properly acquired the Mackey parcel." (R. 372.) 
Proving a fact to the satisfaction of an opposing party has never been a requirement 
for summary judgment. This type of response does not represent even a good faith 
attempt to comply with the rules. The district court simply did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that Simpson's facts were deemed admitted under Rule 7. 
II. EVEN IF MOWER'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES IS 
IGNORED, THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE. 
In her brief to this Court, Mower claims that the district judge ignored her 
evidence, relied upon technicalities, and unfairly penalized her for her failure to 
follow the rules of civil procedure. This is incorrect. As shown below, (I) there 
are really only two issues that matter here, (2) the declaration of Paul Reeb (R. 
384-87) did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding either of those 
issues, and (3) Mower's late-filed declaration (R. 485-87) was inadmissible. 
A. MOWER'S CLAIMS ARE PREMISED ON JUST TWO 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. 
After sifting through Mower's late-filed declaration (R. 485-87) and her 
memorandum in support of her motion to reconsider (R. 827), it is evident that 
there are really only two material facts that Mower attempted to dispute. The first 
issue is whether Mower's husband was her agent. The second issue is whether 
9 
·(itli) 
Simpson was acting as a real e~tate agent such that he owed fiduciary and other 
duties to Mower. As shown below, there is no genuine dispute about ei~her issue. 
1. Mower's Husband Was Her Agent. 
As a matter of law and undisputed fact, Mower's husband was her agent. 
Mower testified at her deposition that she gave to her now-deceased husband, Ken 
Dolezsar, a general power of attorney. Specifically, Mower testified that Dolezsar 
"was managing whatever affected me. So whatever affected me Ken had power of 
attorney to take care of in my stead." (R. 54 7 at 165: 11-13.) 
The following facts· are supported by Mower's own deposition testimony: 
I. Dolezsar was a joint owner of the bank account which was the source 
of the funds for the purchase of the properties, and Dolezsar signed the checks for 
the purchase of the property. (R. 548 at 111: 19-21.) 
2. Dolezsar was Mower's only source of information regarding the 
acquisition of the ranch properties. (R. 548 at 109: 1-12.) 
3. · Dolezsar was the only person Mower worked with because she got 
home very late and worked weekends. (R. 549 at 11 7: 14-19.) 
4. Dolezsar was well aware of the details of every transaction that is the 
subject of this lawsuit. (R. 547 at 108: 2-15.) 
The evidence is clear that Mower gave to Dolezsar the actual authority to 
take all steps necessary to acquire the property for their ranch. She even put him 
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on the bank account with full authority to spend the money in that account on his 
signature alone. 
Mower argues in her brief that she did not give her husband a written power 
of attorney until after the transactions in this case were concluded. However, a 
written document is not necessary to establish actual authority. Moreover, a 
written document giving Dolezsar actual authority does exist in this case-
Dolezsar is a signatory on the bank account from which the purchased funds crune, 
and he was a named joint owner of that account. . 
The law provides that an agent's knowledge is imputed to her/his principal. 
Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, if 27, 134 P.3d l 12~. 
"Imput~d" means: 
attributed vicariously; that is, an act, fact, o·r quality is said to be 
"imputed" to a person when it is ascribed or charge~ to him, not 
because he is personally cognizant of it or responsible for it, but 
because another person is, over whom he has control or for whose acts 
or knowledge he is responsible. 
Black's Law Dictionary 891 (4th ed. 1968). In her untimely declaration, Mower 
claimed that she didn't know what was going on with the acquisition of land for 
the ranch. However, this factual position-even if true-does not create a material 
issue of fact for purposes of summary judgment because Dolezsar' s knowledge is 
imputed to his wife. 
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Furthermore, even ifDolezsar did not have actual authority, he was certainly 
.?lothed with apparent authority. "Where the principal does something to support a 
third party's reasonable belief that the agent has the authority to act, that agent is 
vested with apparent authority to bind the pripcipal." Grazer v. Jones, 2012 UT 
58, ,r 11, 289 P.3d 437. The above-stated facts, including putting Dolezsar on the 
bank account as a signatory with absolute authority over the funds, is more than 
sufficient to communicate to third parties that Dolezsar had the authority with 
regard to these transactions. 
Thus, although Mower argues that the trial court ignored factual disputes 
and penalized her too harshly for not following the rules of civil procedure, the 
actual situation was that there were no genuine issues regarding whether Dolezsar 
was Mower's agent. Mower said it best herself: Ken "was managing whatever 
affected [her]," and "whatever affected [her] Ken had power of attorney to take 
care of in [her] stead." (R. 547 at 105: 11-13.) 
2. Simpson Was Not Acting as a Real Estate Agent. 
The only other material issue of fact is whether David Simpson was acting 
as a real estate agent for Mower. First of all, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )( e) 
specifically precludes a person from claiming that someone was acting as a real 
estate agent unless there is an agreement is in writing. Mower admits that there is 
12 
no such writing. This should end the inquiry. However, even if the statute were 
not fatal to Mower's claim, her argument is contradictory and makes no sense. 
Mower testified that she never_had any communications with Simpson 
regarding the acquisition of any of the properties that were assembled for her and 
her husband. (R. 548 at 109: 1-12.) In fact, Mower is adamant that she would 
never have hired Simpson as a real estate agent. Although she pleaded with 
Dolezsar not to work with Simpson, she did nothing to stop it. 
Because it is undisputed that Simpson never had any communications with 
Mower, then, as matter of law, Mower could not have engaged Simpson's services 
as a real estate agent. The only person who could have engaged Simpson as a real 
estate agent was Dolezsar. This raises two problems for Mower's case. First, 
Dolezsar is deceased, and there is no evidence that he engaged Simpson as a real 
estate agent. Second. Mower claims-adamantly-that Dolezsar was not her 
agent. But if Dolezsar was not acting as an agent for Mower, as Mower claims, 
then Dolezsar could only have hired Simpson to represent Dolezsar. Mower 
cannot have it both ways. She cannot say that her husband was not her agent and 
then argue that her husband was her agent for purposes of hiring Simpson as 
Mower's real estate agent-something she specifically states she would never 
authorize. 
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In her papers before the district court, Mower asked, "If Simpson was not 
acting as a real estate agent, what was he doing?'' First, posing a question such as 
this does not substitute for presenting facts supported by the record. The record 
establishes that there was no real estate agreement and that Simps·on was not 
compensated for his services. But, in any event, the answer to Mower's question is 
that Simpson was helping his friend, Dolezsar. 
In sum, Mower simply did not establish that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding either of the two key questions in this case. She did not 
come forward with admissible evidence to show that her husband was not her 
agent. And she did not come forward with admissible evidence to show that 
Simpson was her real estate agent and that he owed her any duties as such. 
B. THE DECLARATION OF PAUL REEB DID NOT CREATE AN 
FACTUAL DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
Despite the foregoing, Mower argues in her brief to this Court that the 
Declaration of Pa~l Reeb provided evidence that raised a genuine issue of material 
fact and required the trial court to. deny the motion for summary judgment. As 
shown below, this argument also fails. 
The Reed declaration did not create a genuine issue of disputed fact because 
the facts alleged by Mr. Reed are simply not material to the issues that were before 
the district court. Reeb simply stated that Hobble Cree~ Investments "would have 
taken any property contiguous to its own to make up the 10 acres." (R. 386.) At 
14 
_ best this testimony suggests merely that the transaction could have been structured 
differently; it doesn't indicate that there was anything wrong with the way it was 
. structured. Indeed, the testimony confirms that Hobble Creek Investrp.ents 
_required ten contiguous acres and it received ten contiguous acres as agreed in the 
contract signed by Hobble Creek Investments. 
Summary judgment is not precluded whenever some fact may be disputed, 
but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted. The statements made by 
Paul Reeb were not material to the dispositive issues in this case. It simply does 
not matter that the task of assembling properties could have been accomplished in 
a different way than the one selected by Mower's husband. Mower's husband 
made choices, and Mower is bound by them. Thus, district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE STATEMENTS AND OPINIONS OF MOWER WERE 
INADMISSIBLE. 
Mower asserts another argument on appeal. She claims that the district court 
erred in finding that her own untimely declaration was inadmissible as evidence 
because it was contradicted by her deposition testimony and because it contained 
conclusions as opinions. This argument is also wrong. 
A week after filing her opposition to Simpson's motion for summary 
judgment, Mower filed a declaration with the district court. (R. 485-87.) The 
15 
district court properly ruled that the statements and opinions contained in the late-
filed declaration were inadmissible. 
''[A]n affiant may not 'raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition unless he provides an explanation for the discrepancy."' 
Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2006 UT App 304, 113, 141 P.3d 624. There is 
nothing in the Mower Declaration that is consistent with her prior sworn deposition 
testimony, and .there is no explanation for the discrepancies. 
Mower testified in her deposition that she gave Dolezsar a general power of 
attorney and relied on him to take care of everything related to the acquisition of 
the ranch property. By doing so she authorized everything that he did. Mower 
testified that Dolezsar, her husband, knew every detail of every transaction that is 
the subject of this lawsuit. And, by virtue of appointing Dolezsar as her agent, 
Mower is deemed to have the same knowledge as Dolezsar had. Contrary to her 
sworn deposition testimony, Mower attempted to avoid summary judgment by 
stating in her declaration that she did not give Dolezsar any such authorization and 
that she didn't know the details of the transactions. As to not knowing the details 
of the transactions, this is completely irrelevant. It does nothing to establish that 
Dolezsar was not her agent. As for Mower's claims that she did not authorize 
Dolezsar to take certain specific actions, such claims are also irrelevant. Dolezsar 
had broad authority. This fact is not changed by Mower's testimony that she did 
16 
not authorize each specific step that was taken along the way. Finally, to the extent 
that Mower was attempting to argue that Dolezsar did not have any authority, such 
a statement flatly contradicts her deposition testimony. And Mower cannot rely on 
inconsistencies in her own testimony to create an issue of fact. The district court 
did not err in ruling that the Mower Declaration was inadmissible and that it did 
not raise any genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. 
III. BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS. THE DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY RULED THAT SIMPSON WAS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON EACH OF THE CAUSES 
OF ACTION CONTAINED IN MOWER'S COMPLAINT. 
Based·upon the undisputed facts, the district court correctly ruled that 
Simpson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the causes of 
action contained in Mower's complaint. 
A. FRAUD· AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
The district· court correctly granted summary judgment against Mower on 
her claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation because Mower did not come 
·forward with any evidence that Simpson had made any false representations. First, 
there is no evidence that Simpson made ~my representation at all. Mower testified 
that she did not have any conversations with Simpson regarding any of the 
transactions that are the subject of this action. Thus, any allegedly false 
representation would have necessarily been made to Mower's husband, Dolezsar. 
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However, Dolezsar died whil~ Mower was in prison in California, and any claimed 
statement by Dolezsar is barred by Rules 601 and 802 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. In short, there is no admissible evidence that there were any 
representations made by Simpson to Mower regarding the acquisition or transfer of 
the properties at issue in this case. 
In addition, even if Mower could provide admissible evidence regarding 
statements that were made by Simpson, the alleged statements referred to in 
Mower's memorandum opposing summary judgment were true. In essence, 
Mower claims that Simpson lied about the property that he was acquiri~g and that 
he failed to transfer the property to Mower. The facts are that all of the property 
purchased for the Mower horse ranch and equestrian center was deeded to 
Mower's company-LD Ranch, LLC-on July 17, 2007, more than three years 
prior to the time the Complaint was filed. 
Mower's allegations seem to relate to some acreage that Simpson ( acting 
under Dolezsar's direction) traded as part of a deal to acquire property that was 
necessary for the equestrian center. The property that was acquired as a result of 
the trade is known as the "Thornhill Parcel," and it is the very parcel where the 
equest!ian center now stands. There were no false representations made in 
connection with trading that piece of property. 
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Mower argues that the task could have been accomplished some other way 
and that the Thornhill Parcel could have been obtained by trading different land. 
Even if this is true, it is completely irrelevant. The fact that Dolezsar (with 
Simpson's help) might have gone about the process differently is not a basis for 
now alleging that Simpson defrauded Mower. Mower got exactly what she asked 
her husband to acquire-a parcel on which she could build a horse ranch and 
equestrian center. As a matter of law, there was no fraud or misrepresentation, and 
the district court correctly granted summary judgment on these claims. 
B. BREACH-OF-FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
The district court also properly granted summary judgment against Mower 
on her breach-of-fiduciary duty claim. Mower alleges that the Simpson 
Defendants breached fiduciary duties to her by acquiring property in their own 
names and by keeping such property for their own use. The district court correctly 
rejected these claims on summary judgment. 
Mower's husband instructed Simpson to acquire property in names other 
than Mower's. He could, of course, have instructed Simpson to acquire the parcels 
in Mower's own name. However, if property owners in the canyon had learned 
that Mower was trying to assemble a large parcel, they may have demanded more 
money for their land. In any event, regardless of whether Mower's husband was 
right or wrong in his strategy, it is undisputed that he instructed Simpson to acquire 
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the parcels in names other than Mower's. This does not constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
The only involvement of Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC 
in this case was that they acted as nominees to take title to property and then 
transfer that title to Mower. At most, these companies had a contractual duty and 
not a fiduciary duty. And Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC 
fulfilled their contractual duty when they transferred title to the properties to 
Mower. 
Mower alleges that Simpson, as a manager ofLD III, LC or LD Ranch, 
LLC, owed a duty to those entities to not put his interests above the interests of 
those entities. But there is no evidence that Simpson did so. Simpson did not 
benefit from the transactions at issue. He merely assisted in the assembling of 
property for a horse ranch and equestrian center, and he delivered to Mower the 
property acquired for the horse ranch and equestrian center. 
Mower alleges that Simpson breached his fiduciary duty by deeding some of 
the acquired property to the owner of the Thornhill Parcel. However, as stated 
above, certain property was traded in order to acquire the very parcel on which the 
equestrian center sits. Could the deal have been put together differently? Perhaps. 
But Simpson's actions in this regard hardly amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
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Simpson did not put his own interests first and he did not acquire anything as a 
result of the various transactions. 
Further, the undisputed fact is that none of the Simpson Defendants were 
engaged as a real estate agent for Mower. Thus, they did not owe Mower any 
duties as a real estate agent: 
Q. If I understand your testimony so far today, is that you never 
agreed that Simpson would be your real estate agent; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What I want to understand is did you see any document that 
appointed Dave as your real estate agent? 
A. No. You will not find any document with my signature on it 
that says he's my real estate agent. 
Q. Is there a document with Ken's signature on it whereby Dave is 
appointed as a real estate agent? 
A. Not that I've seen. 
(R. 544 at 42: 5-8 and 43: 4-10.) 
In sum, Simpson was not acting as a real estate agent, and therefore was not 
acting in a fiduciary capacity. Furthermore, as stated above, any claim that he was 
acting as a real estate agent and breached a fiduciary duty is barred by the statute 
of frauds. Utah Code Ann.§ 25-5-4(1)(e). 
C. CONVERSION. 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Mower's claim 
for conversion. The basis of Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for conversion is 
stated in paragraph 1 ~ 4 of the complaint: 
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Simps~:m used Leslie's and LD Ill's funds for his own purposes when 
he used them to purchase real property but acquired_ it in the name of 
Wood Springs and/or Pheasant meadows, when he used the real 
property for his own purposes and when he transferred part of the real 
property to other parties. 
(R. 119.) As set forth above, Wood Springs and Pheasant Meadows took title to 
the property as nomi~ees at the request ofDolezsar. The properties acquired for 
the horse ranch and equestrian center were then transferred to Mower more than 
three years before this lawsuit was filed. There is no evidence that any of the 
Simpson Defendants used any of the property for their own use. And there is 
simply no evidence that any of the Simpson Defendants ended up with any of the 
property. As a matter of law, they did not convert any of Mower's property for 
their own use. As explained above, they did trade a parcel of property. But this 
was for Mower's benefit, not their own. As a result of the trade the Simpson 
Defendants acquired nothing, and Mower acquired the very piece of land on which 
her equestrian center now sits. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting 
summary judgment against Mower on her conversion claim. 
D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Mower's next claim is that the Simpson Defendants were unjustly enriched. 
The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim as well. As 
stated above, Mower presented absolutely no evidence ( and she does not cite any 
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on appeal) that the Simpson Defendants ever used any property for their own use 
or that Mower was ever deprived of the use of property. 
E. CONSPIRACY. 
Mower did not present any admissible evidence of any conspiracy between 
the defendants. The acquisition of property for Mower-including the trade of 
some property in order to acquire land that was not on a hillside and on which the 
equestrian center could be built-was achieved through arms-length negotiated 
contracts. Mower presented no evidence to suggest otherwise, and the- district 
court did not err in dismissing Mower's conspiracy claim. 
IV. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING LEGAL ARGUMENTS, THE 
DISTRICT COURT ALSO CORRECTLY RULED THAT MOWER'S 
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
If the Simpson Defendants (I) converted property, (2) breached fiduciary 
duties, or (3) were unjustly enriched as a result of having the properties titled in 
their own names, then such wrongs occurred when the parcels were acquired in 
names other than Mower's. The Storrs Parcel closed on February 15, 2006. The 
Crandall Parcel closed on March 3, 2006. The Olsen Parcel closed on July 3, 
2006, and the last event to complete the closing of the Thornhill Parcel occurred on 
August 27, 2006. All of the transactions were closed in the names of Wood 
Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC, as nominees. Any claims of 
conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment and conspiracy were 
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barred within four years of each closing. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-3 07. The 
complaint was not filed until November 12, 2010, which is more than four years 
after each of the transactions. 
The fraud and negligent misrepresentations claims were barred even earlier. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3), those claims were barred within three 
years. Accordingly, those claims were barred no later than August 27, 2009, more 
than a year before the complaint was filed. 
V. MOWER DID NOT PRESENT ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
THAT SHE SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES. 
With the exception of one parcel that Mower currently refuses to accept, 
Mower received all of the property that was acquired for her horse ranch and 
equestrian center. And the remaining parcel is available to Mower the moment she 
accepts the deeds_prepared to accomplish that transfer. Accordingly, there is no 
other property to transfer, and Mower has suffered no damages. Therefore, the 
district court correctly granted summary judgment for this reason as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
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DATED this 24th day of February, 2016. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
~~ 
Craig Carlile 
Brent b. Wride 
Attorneys for Simpson Defendants 
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